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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Therefore, the court of appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)0(2002). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. 
Between the time this litigation commenced and the instant appeal, Intervenor 
Wheeler Machinery Co. completed construction of the building that is the subject of this 
action. The threshold question presented is whether such completion has rendered this 
appeal moot. 
This issue was not presented below. Rather, the issue of mootness arose as a 
result of Wheeler Machinery's Rule 37(a) Suggestion of Mootness. On January 29, 2004, 
this Court deferred ruling on the Suggestion of Mootness and ordered full briefing of the 
mootness issue on plenary review of the case.l 
As a result of the procedural posture of this issue, there is no particular standard of 
review for this Court to apply. Rather, mootness is a matter of judicial policy and 
therefore whether an issue has been rendered moot and whether a court will consider an 
issue that is technically moot is left to the discretion of the court. See Ellis v. Swensen, 
2000 UT 101426, 16 P.3d 1233. 
1
 This Order is attached at Addendum E. 
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n. 
Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the Planning Commission's failure to 
mail notice of the meeting at which it approved Wheeler's conditional use permit did not 
deprive Petitioners of their right to due process because Petitioners cannot show such 
notice would have resulted in a different outcome. 
Standard of Review. The trial court decided this issue on summary judgment. 
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court reviews the trial court's legal 
conclusions for correctness. See Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of 
Springville, 1999 UT 25, T[22, 979 P.2d 332. 
Preservation. This issue was presented below and is preserved at R. 183-84. 
III. 
Whether the trial court correctly ruled that it was without jurisdiction as a result of 
Petitioners' failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. 
Standard of Review. The trial court decided this issue on summary judgment. 
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court reviews the trial court's legal 
conclusions for correctness. See Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of 
Springville, 1999 UT 25, TT22, 979 P.2d 332. 
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Preservation. This issue was presented below and is preserved at R. 181-82. 
DETERMINATIVE LEGISLATION 
Statutes and ordinances whose interpretation is determinative or which are of 
central importance to this appeal include the following: 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-704 (2003), which provides: 
(1) (a) (i) The applicant or any other person or entity adversely affected by 
a decision administering or interpreting a zoning ordinance may appeal that 
decision applying the zoning ordinance by alleging that there is error in any order, 
requirement, decision, or determination made by an official in the administration 
or interpretation of the zoning ordinance. 
(ii) The legislative body shall enact an ordinance establishing a reasonable 
time for appeal to the board of adjustment of decisions administering or 
interpreting a zoning ordinance. 
(b) Any officer, department, board, or bureau of a municipality affected by 
the grant or refusal of a building permit or by any other decisions of the 
administrative officer in the administration or interpretation of the zoning 
ordinance may appeal any decision to the board of adjustment. 
(2) The board of adjustment shall hear and decide appeals from planning 
commission decisions regarding conditional use permits unless the zoning 
ordinance designates the legislative body or another body to hear conditional use 
permit appeals. 
(3) The person or entity making the appeal has the burden of proving that 
an error has been made. 
(4) (a) Only decisions applying the zoning ordinance may be appealed to 
the board of adjustment. 
(b) A person may not appeal, and the board of adjustment may not 
consider, any zoning ordinance amendments. 
(5) Appeals may not be used to waive or modify the terms or requirements 
of the zoning ordinance. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (Supp. 2003), which provides: 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use 
decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation made under authority of 
this chapter until that person has exhausted his administrative remedies. 
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise 
of or in violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of 
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the decision with the district court within 30 days after the local decision is 
rendered. 
(b) (i) The time under Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition is tolled from the 
date a property owner files a request for arbitration of a constitutional taking issue 
with the private property ombudsman under Section 63-34-13 until 30 days after: 
(A) the arbitrator issues a final award; or 
(B) the private property ombudsman issues a written statement under 
Subsection 63-34-13(4)(b) declining to arbitrate or to appoint an arbitrator. 
(ii) A tolling under Subsection (2)(b)(i) operates only as to the specific 
constitutional taking issues that are the subject of the request for arbitration filed 
with the private property ombudsman by a property owner. 
(iii) A request for arbitration filed with the private property ombudsman 
after the time under Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition has expired does not affect 
the time to file a petition. 
(3) The courts shall: 
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and 
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or 
illegal. 
Washington City Zoning Ordinance § 3-6, attached in full at Addendum B. 
Washington City Zoning Ordinance § 8-6, attached in full at Addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves the propriety of a municipal land use decision where the 
municipality failed to provide mailed notice to neighboring landowners of the meeting at 
which the municipal land use decision was made. More specifically, this case requires 
the reviewing court to consider the parameters of due process and the purpose behind the 
notice requirement as a prerequisite to municipal land use action in a situation where the 
landowner challenging such action cannot show that the land use decision would have 
been different had mailed notice been provided. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Additionally, this case addresses whether a landowner who challenges a land use 
decision but fails to enjoin the decision from taking effect, necessarily renders his 
challenge moot by depriving the reviewing court of any opportunity to provide him relief. 
B, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
In November 2001, the Washington City Planning Commission held a public 
hearing to consider Wheeler Machinery's application for a conditional use permit. The 
Planning Commission voted to deny the application. Wheeler appealed the decision to 
the Washington City Council, which affirmed. Wheeler then sought review in the Fifth 
District Court for Washington County. 
In August 2002, the Fifth District Court entered summary judgment for Wheeler, 
determining that the City Council's decision was not based upon substantial evidence in 
the record. The matter then came back before the Planning Commission, which, in 
November 2002, approved Wheeler's application and issued it a conditional use permit. 
Petitioners then filed a new action in the Fifth District Court challenging the 
Planning Commission's decision. Wheeler intervened in this action. On cross-motions 
for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Washington 
City and Wheeler, denied Petitioners' motion for summary judgment and dismissed their 
action. 
This appeal followed. Shortly after this appeal was filed, Wheeler filed a Rule 
37(a) Suggestion of Mootness. This Court deferred ruling on the motion until plenary 
review of the case. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 7, 2001, the Washington City Planning Commission ("Planning 
Commission") held a public hearing to consider Intervener/Appellee Wheeler Machinery, 
Co.'s ("Wheeler") application to the City for a conditional use permit. (R. 178.) 
Wheeler applied for the conditional use permit to locate a commercial business in 
Washington City. (R. 178.) 
Representatives and residents of Petitioners the Highlands Homeowners 
Association and Turtle Creek Homeowners Association were present at and presented 
their objections to the Planning Commission. (R. 236-237.) The Turtle Creek 
Homeowners Association also presented a letter objecting to Wheeler's application. (R. 
211.) The general sentiment of these objections was concern with safety, traffic, noise, 
and fumes from Wheeler's proposed business. (R. 211, 236-237.) 
The Planning Commission voted to deny Wheeler's application. (R. 178.) 
Wheeler appealed the Planning Commission's decision to the Washington City Council 
("City Council").2 (R. 178.) 
On January 9, 2002, the City Council held a public hearing to consider Wheeler's 
appeal of the Planning Commission's decision. (R. 178.) Again, several named 
2
 The City Council is the municipal body Washington City has designated by ordinance to hear 
appeals from the Planning Commission's conditional use permit decisions. See Wash. City Ord. 
8-6; Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-407 (2002); see also Ralph L. Wadsworth Constr., Inc. v. West 
Jordan City, 2000 UT App 49, Iff 12-13, 999 P.2d 1240 (upholding city council jurisdiction over 
conditional use permit appeals under section 10-9-407). 
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Petitioners were either personally in attendance or had representatives in attendance on 
their behalf. (R. 255-256.) Specifically, Petitioners Karen Golay, Grace Blackburn, and 
Morgan Bingham voiced their objections to Wheeler's application. (R. 255-256.) 
Representatives and residents of the Highlands Homeowners Association and Turtle 
Creek Homeowners Association also presented their objections to the City Council. (R. 
255-256.) Once again, the general sentiment of these objections was concern with safety, 
traffic, noise, and fumes. (R. 255-256.) 
After hearing this public comment, the City Council, by a 3-2 vote, affirmed the 
Planning Commission's denial of Wheeler's application. (R. 178.) On January 14, 2002, 
Wheeler appealed the City Council's decision to the Fifth District Court for Washington 
County. (R. 178.) The case, In re Wheeler Machinery Co., Case No. 02050091, was 
assigned to the Honorable G. Rand Beacham. (R. 178.) 
On August 12, 2002, Judge Beacham issued a ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment filed by Wheeler and, in an extensive opinion, ruled in favor of Wheeler, 
determining there was not substantial evidence in the record to support the City Council's 
denial of Wheeler's conditional use permit. (R. 260-277, 179.) Thus, Judge Beacham 
concluded that the denial was arbitrary, capricious, and illegal, and remanded the matter 
back to the Planning Commission. (R. 260-277, 179.) 
On September 4, 2002, Wheeler's application for a conditional use permit again 
came before the Planning Commission for consideration. (R. 179.) This time it was not 
for a public hearing; rather, in light of Judge Beacham's ruling, the Planning Commission 
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was presented with the mere formality of issuing Wheeler's conditional use permit. (R. 
179.) 
Public notice of the September 4, 2002, Planning Commission meeting was 
provided by the City as follows: (a) a true and correct copy of the meeting agenda was 
posted in a conspicuous place in the Washington City Offices; (b) a true and correct copy 
of the meeting agenda was posted on the City's website; (c) a true and correct copy of the 
meeting agenda was provided to the Spectrum, a newspaper of general circulation in 
Southern Utah; and (d) all of such actions were performed at least 24 hours prior to the 
meeting. (R. 179.) < ; : 
The public notice of the meeting agenda clearly showed, at item no. 10, that the 
Planning Commission would consider Wheeler's application for a conditional use permit 
at the meeting. (R. 179.) Notice of the September 4, 2002, Planning Commission < 
meeting was not mailed to residents living within a 300-foot radius of Wheeler's 
property. (R. 179.) r 
Because the September 4, 2002, Planning Commission meeting was not a public 
hearing no public comment or input was taken. (R. 179.) Rather, the Planning 
Commission staff advised the Planning Commission that all items of concern had been 
addressed at the previous two public hearings on the matter (November 7, 2001, before 
the Planning Commission, and January 9, 2002, before the City Council) and 
recommended that the Planning Commission approve Wheeler's application. (R. 180.) 
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The Planning Commission voted to approve Wheeler's application, subject to 
Wheeler's ability to meet certain conditions recommended by the staff. (R. 180.) These 
conditions reflected the concerns made by the public (including the named Petitioners) at 
the previous two public hearings insofar as the Planning Commission imposed, inter alia, 
quiet time hours, entrance and exit traffic prohibitions, surrounding block walls and trees, 
dust free surfacing, and landscaping. (R. 281-286; see also Add. D.) 
None of the Petitioners filed an appeal of the decision to the City Council. (R. 
180.) Approximately two weeks later, however, on September 20, 2002, Petitioners filed 
a motion for leave to intervene in and for reconsideration of Judge Beacham's summary 
judgment ruling. (R. 180.) Thereafter, on or about October 4, 2002, Petitioners filed the 
instant action as a "Petition for Review" against the City. (R. 1, 180.) This case was 
assigned to Judge Shumate. (R 1.) On November 5, 2002, Judge Beacham denied 
Petitioners' motion to intervene. (R. 180.) 
Wheeler was successful, however, with its motion to intervene in the instant case. 
(R. 40.) Thereafter, all parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. (R.177.) The 
trial court, finding no genuine issue of material fact precluding its ruling on the motions 
as a matter of law, entered summary judgment in favor of the City and Wheeler, denied 
Petitioners' motion for summary judgment, and dismissed Petitioners' action. (R.175.) 
In its ruling, the trial court determined that: (a) Judge Beacham's prior ruling was 
a mandate to the City to issue the conditional use permit and therefore there was no 
requirement for an additional public hearing on the issue of the permit; (b) that the trial 
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court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 1001(1), was without jurisdiction for Petitioners' 
failure to appeal the Planning Commission's decision to the City Council; and (c) 
although Petitioners were not provided mailed notice in accordance with City ordinance, 
they were not able to show prejudice and therefore were not denied due process. (R. 177-
184; see also Add. A.) 
Petitioners appealed. (R. 190.) Between the time the Planning Commission 
issued the conditional use permit and the instant appeal, however, Wheeler moved 
forward and completed construction of its building.3 On that basis, Wheeler filed a Rule 
37(a) Suggestion of Mootness. (Add. E.) On January 29, 2004, this Court deferred 
ruling on the Suggestion of Mootness and ordered full briefing of the mootness issue on 
plenary review of the case. (Add. E.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. 
The Utah Supreme Court has a long-standing policy against rendering advisory 
opinions. Thus, where circumstances arise between the time the litigation begins and 
appellate review that render the issues moot, the reviewing court should decline to decide < 
the issue and dismiss the appeal. 
In this case, Petitioners challenge the City's issuance of a conditional use permit to 
Wheeler Machinery. However, in the course of challenging such issuance, Petitioners 
3
 Because this information arose after the trial court litigation, it does not appear of record. i 
However, it was provided to this Court on Wheeler's Suggestion of Mootness and has not been 
disputed by Petitioners, either in opposition to the Suggestion of Mootness or in their brief. 
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did not take any action to enjoin Wheeler from, on the basis of the permit, moving 
forward to construct its building. Thus, between the time Petitioners initiated the 
litigation and this appeal, Wheeler has completed construction and is now operating its 
business. 
The relief Petitioners seek with this appeal is the opportunity to impose additional 
restrictions and conditions on Wheeler's conditional use permit. However, completion of 
the building effectively deprives Petitioners' requested relief of any practical significance 
as such relief would necessarily require Wheeler to alter permanent structures of cement 
and steel. Therefore, this appeal has been rendered moot as there is no relief that can be 
granted that will affect the rights of the litigants. 
2. 
Second, if this Court determines to address the substantive issues, the trial court 
must be affirmed. With regard to the Petitioners' due process claims, the trial court 
correctly reasoned that although the City did not provide mailed notice in accordance 
with its ordinances, the same has not deprived Petitioners of their right to due process 
because Petitioners cannot show that such notice would have resulted in a different 
outcome. 
Indeed, Petitioners would not have had the opportunity to present their objections 
at the subject meeting because it was not a public hearing. Furthermore, Petitioners 
cannot escape the record in this case which makes clear that, far from being deprived of a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard, Petitioners had a complete and frill opportunity at 
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two previous hearings on the issue to present their objections to the conditional use 
permit, which objections were actually addressed in the final permit issued to Wheeler. 
3. 
Finally, exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to judicial review is mandated 
by Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(1). Petitioners failed to do so in this case. Therefore, 
the trial court correctly ruled that it was without jurisdiction to consider Petitioners' 
petition for review. 
ARGUMENT 
L THIS APPEAL HAS BEEN RENDERED MOOT AS THERE IS NO 
RELIEF THAT CAN BE GRANTED THAT WILL AFFECT THE RIGHTS 
OF THE LITIGANTS. 
"Ordinarily [this Court] will not adjudicate issues when the underlying case is 
moot." Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101, ^[25, 16 P.3d 1233 (citing Burkett v. 
Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989)). "'A case is deemed moot when the 
requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants."5 Id (quoting Burkett, 
773 P.2d at 44). Occasionally appellate courts will "consider a technically moot issue if 
it falls within the 'public interest exception' to the mootness doctrine." Id 
"The public interest exception to the mootness doctrine arises 'when the case 
presents an issue that affects the public interest, is likely to recur, and because of the brief 
time that any one litigant is effected, is capable of evading, review.5" Id. at [^26 (quoting 
Burkett, 773 P.2d at 44). 
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Thus, in determining this issue, the first question is whether this appeal has been 
rendered moot, and if so, whether it falls within the public interest exception. Addressing 
these questions in turn, it is clear the issues on appeal are moot and do not fall within the 
public interest exception. 
A. Petitioners' Failure to Seek Injunctive Relief to Prevent Wheeler's 
Completion of Construction Has Rendered this Appeal Moot. 
Wheeler brought its Rule 37(a) Suggestion of Mootness asserting that because it 
fully constructed its building between the time the Planning Commission issued its 
conditional use permit and the instant appeal, it has gone from having a conditional use 
under Washington City Zoning Ordinance 24-l(2)(a) (requiring conditional use approval 
for development of any vacant parcel of land) to a permitted use under Washington City 
Zoning Ordinance 24-2(1 )(b) (allowing use of existing structure as an automobile or 
vehicle sales and repair shop). Thus, Wheeler asserts that no further conditions can be 
placed on its conditional use permit as sought by Petitioners. 
The City agrees with Wheeler that completion of its building has mooted this 
appeal. However, the City asserts this appeal is moot for different reasons.4 The relief 
requested by Petitioners is the opportunity to appear before the Planning Commission 
and/or the City Council to argue for "additional restrictions" and conditions on Wheeler's 
conditional use permit. (Br. at 10.) Petitioners have not readily identified what types of 
4
 The City does not agree with and cannot ascribe to the assertion that a conditional use 
automatically converts to a permitted use upon completion of construction of a building on 
vacant land. Such a proposition would fundamentally alter municipal authority to regulate 
zoning issues and the City is otherwise unaware of any authority supporting such a proposition. 
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restrictions or conditions they would like to advocate but generally assert that they would 
be in the nature of "restrictions on the hours of operation, noise limitations, etc." (Br. at 
10.) 
As evidenced in the record, however, the "additional" restrictions Petitioners seek 
can be implemented only by actual redesign, alteration, and construction to the premises. 
(R. 207, 224-226, 243-245, 250, 280-293.) For example, to address noise concerns, the 
Planning Commission required Wheeler to construct its building with concrete walls, 
construct a block wall around the premises adjacent to residential homes, and design and 
plant landscaping to drown out noise. (R. 243-45, 281-293.) Further, entrances and exits 
were designed and engineered to handle the size of Wheeler's trucks and machinery and 
road surfaces were designed to protect the public streets. (R. 224-226, 243-246, 281-
293.) Each of these items—undisputedly now in place—required engineering and 
architectural designs, as well as feasibility studies, all at the cost and expense of Wheeler. 
Should Petitioners ultimately prevail on appeal, this Court certainly will not 
require Wheeler to obtain new engineering plans and otherwise tear down or alter brick, 
steel, and vegetation to allow Petitioners to appeal the conditions imposed by the { 
Planning Commission in the hopes that the City Council will be receptive to their claims. 
Particularly in circumstances such as these where Petitioners failed to act to protect their 
interests by obtaining or seeking some type of injunctive relief to prevent construction 
pending the outcome of the litigation. 
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Whatever may be said about Petitioners' notice of the Planning Commission 
meeting, Petitioners filed the instant action thirty days after the Planning Commission 
approved Wheeler's conditional use permit application. Petitioners actually began 
litigation a little over two weeks after the conditional use permit was approved, by filing 
a motion to intervene before Judge Beacham. Thus, Petitioners had adequate time and 
opportunity to seek injunctive relief against the construction of Wheeler's building 
pending an outcome of their challenge to the conditional use permit. 
Moreover, contrary to Petitioners' assertions, ample authority exists to support the 
proposition that a party challenging a zoning action who does not seek injunctive relief to 
stop construction of a building during the pendency of the litigation risks the possibility 
of having their claim mooted upon completion of the construction. See City of New 
Orleans v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 694 So. 2d 975, 977 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (affirming dismissal 
of case as moot where completion of project prevented court from giving any practical 
relief); Dreikausen v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 774 N.E.2d 193, 198 (N.Y. 2002) 
(dismissing appeal as moot where challenger's failure to seek preliminary injunctive 
relief to preserve status quo and prevent construction from commencing or continuing 
during pendency of litigation prevented court from fashioning any practical relief); see 
also, e.g., Zoning Bd. of Adjustment v. DeVilbiss, 729 P.2d 353, 358-59 (Colo. 1986) 
(declaring challenge to zoning decision moot where challenged construction project was 
completed during pendency of action and plaintiff failed to obtain injunctive relief to 
enjoin such construction); Wells v. Lodge Props., Inc., 976 P.2d 321, 325 (Colo. Ct. App. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1998) (finding case not moot where plaintiff sought injunctive relief, building was not 
completed, and action filed before issuance of permit). 
As stated by the Colorado Supreme Court, a party who fails to seek injunctive 
relief "must bear some responsibility for a change in circumstances between the 
commencement of the action and the ultimate resolution of the case on the merits." 
DeVilbiss, 729 P.2d at 357. Along the same lines, both the Utah Supreme Court and this 
Court have refused to relieve parties from their choice of litigation strategy when such 
strategy ultimately works to their detriment—however harsh the result may be. See 
Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment 2002 UT 77, TJ19, 52 P.3d 1267 (refusing to 
grant exception to res judicata where party failed to exhaust appeals), ajfg, Collins v. 
Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment 2000 UT App 371,1J26, 16 P.3d 1251 (same). 
This general policy should certainly be applied here where the remedy sought may 
require "complete removal or radical alteration of the construction project undertaken and 
completed at considerable expense and pursuant to governmental permit processes." 
DeVUbiss, 729 P.2d at 359. 
Furthermore, with regard to those conditions Petitioners seek that do not require 
alteration of or tearing down permanent structures (such as quiet time), Petitioners have 
failed, both before the trial court and on appeal, to present any evidence or give any 
indication as to wrhat specific conditions they seek, and how those conditions differ from 
the conditions presently in force. Indeed, throughout this litigation Petitioners have 
simply ignored the conditional use permit that was issued and is currently in place. This 
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Court need not seriously entertain Petitioners' cryptic requests for conditions where they 
fail to consider the present conditions or otherwise articulate the specifics of the 
conditions they seek. 
In sum, because this Court can grant no relief that will affect the rights of the 
litigants, this case is moot and any decision from this Court would constitute a mere 
advisory opinion, the issuance of which would undermine longstanding judicial policy. 
See Keller v. Southwood N. Med. Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102, 108-09 (Utah 1998) 
(Russon, J., concurring in result) (citing Utah Supreme Court decisions on longstanding 
policy against rendering advisory opinions); Stewart v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 
759, 784-85 (Utah 1994) (Howe, J., dissenting) (stating "it is not the province of this 
court" to answer "abstract, hypothetical, or otherwise moot cases"); State v. Sims, 881 
P.2d 840, 842 (Utah 1994) (stating "[w]hen declaring an issue moot, a court specifically 
declines to address the merits"); Merhish v. H.A. Folsom & Assocs., 646 P.2d 731, 732 
(Utah 1982) ("strong judicial policy against giving advisory opinions dictates that courts 
refrain from adjudicating moot questions"); McRae v. Jackson, 526 P.2d 1190, 1191 
(Utah 1974) ("The function of appellate courts . . . is not to give opinions on merely 
abstract or theoretical matters, but only to decide actual controversies injuriously 
affecting the rights of some party to the litigation, and it has been held that questions or 
cases which have become moot or academic are not a proper subject to review."). 
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B. This Case does not fall within the Public Interest Exception because it 
is Not Likely to Recur Yet Evade Review. 
Petitioners argue that even if this appeal has been rendered moot, it falls within the 
public interest exception and therefore should be considered by this Court. First and 
foremost, as set forth above, it should be noted that exceptions to the mootness should not 
be employed merely to reach an interesting question. Rather, such exceptions should be 
used "occasionally" and even then only in "extraordinary circumstances". Merhish, 646 
P.2d at 732. Petitioners have provided no valid reason for this Court to depart from this 
standard. 
As an initial matter, while Petitioners generally recite the public interest exception, 
they fail to give it any meaningful application to this case other than inviting this Court to 
issue an advisory opinion to other municipalities in Utah. (Br. at 12.) Specifically, 
Petitioners have made no argument that the situation presented here is likely to recur yet 
evade review. See Ellis, 2000 UT 101 at Tf26. 
As set forth in the statement of facts, this case arrives at this Court having been 
through two public hearings, an administrative appeal, as well as prior litigation resulting 
in a well-reasoned opinion by a respected district court judge who mandated issuance of 
the permit at issue. The procedural posture of this case, therefore, is not likely to recur 
very often—if at all—and Petitioners have failed to argue otherwise. 
Further, the issue here is not likely to evade review "because of the brief time that 
any one litigant is affected." Id. Rather, any litigant may seek exactly what Petitioners 
failed to seek in the instant case: injunctive relief to prevent the case from becoming 
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moot prior to completion of the litigation. Therefore, it does not fall within the public 
interest exception to the mootness doctrine. 
In sum5 this Court should dismiss this appeal as moot. 
II. THE CITY'S FAILURE TO MAIL NOTICE OF THE PLANNING 
COMMISSION MEETING DID NOT DENY PLAINTIFFS DUE PROCESS 
BECAUSE PETITIONERS WERE NOT PREJUDICED BY SUCH 
FAILURE. 
In addition to the notice requirements of the Open and Public Meetings Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 52-4-1 to -10 (2002),5 Washington City Zoning Ordinance § 3-6 provides 
that notice of Planning Commission meetings be "mailed to all property owners 
appearing on the latest ownership plat in the Washington County Recorders Office within 
a three hundred (300) foot radius of any property for which an action of the Planning 
Commission [on a conditional use permit] is being requested." Wash. City Zoning Ord. § 
3-6. 
It is undisputed that the City did not provide this mailed notice. Petitioners assert 
that this failure invalidates the issuance of the conditional use permit and otherwise 
denied them of their right to due process. This assertion is erroneous. As the trial court 
correctly concluded, the City's failure to provide mailed notice did not violate 
Petitioners' right to due process or invalidate the action taken by the Planning 
5
 The City's compliance with the Open and Public Meetings Act is undisputed and was not 
challenged below or on appeal. 
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Commission because providing such notice would not have resulted in a different 
outcome. 
The trial court's conclusion relied upon and is consistent with the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, 
1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332. In Springville Citizens, the plaintiffs challenged the city 
council's approval of a planned unit development on the grounds that the city had failed 
to follow the requirements of its own PUD approval process. See id. at ^[11. The district 
court entered judgment for the city on the grounds that the city had substantially 
complied with its ordinances in the approval process. See id. at^fl3. On appeal, the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the city must follow its mandatory ordinances, not 
merely substantially comply with them. See id. at f 29. 
However, the supreme court determined that the city's failure to follow its 
mandatory ordinances did not automatically entitle the plaintiffs to relief. See id. at | 3 1 . 
"Rather, [the] plaintiffs must establish that they were prejudiced by the [cjity's 
noncompliance with its ordinances or, in other words, how, if at all, the [cjity's decision 
would have been different and what relief, if any, they are entitled to as a result." Id. { 
(emphasis added). The case was then remanded to the district court for a determination 
of whether the city's decision would have been different had it complied with its 
ordinances. See id. at Tf1f32-33; see also 8A McQuillin, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 
25.249 (3d ed. rev. 1994) (stating defects in notice are generally disregarded where they 
< 
have not prejudiced interested persons). 
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Petitioners fail to explain how the outcome of the Planning Commission meeting 
might have been different had they been mailed notice. They claim, in conclusory 
fashion, that they could have argued to the Planning Commission or, on a timely appeal, 
to the City Council, for the imposition of "different conditions" of approval for Wheeler's 
conditional use permit. (Br. at 8, 10.) Petitioners assert that these conditions would 
include "restrictions on the hours of operation, noise limitations, etc." (Br. at 10.) 
This argument ignores two essential facts. First, the Planning Commission 
meeting was not a public hearing and therefore Petitioners would have had no 
opportunity to argue for different conditions. And, second, that Petitioners have already 
had the opportunity, both before the Planning Commission and the City Council, to 
express their concerns and opinions, and, as is clear from the conditional use permit 
issued by the Planning Commission, such concerns were taken into consideration. 
Taking these facts in turn, it is clear that Petitioners cannot show they suffered prejudice. 
A. As Spectators to the Proceedings, Petitioners could not have affected 
the Outcome. 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, the notice requirement is "to apprise 
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present 
their objections " Tolman v. Salt Lake County, 20 Utah 2d 310, 318, 437 P.2d 442, 
448 (1968) (citation and quotation omitted); see also, e.g.. Harper v. Summit County, 
2001 UT 10, TJ38, 26 P.2d 193 (holding open meetings act not implicated where act at 
issue was ministerial in nature). In other words, as the trial court reasoned, "where an 
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interested party might have an opportunity to be heard and present his or her objections to 
a proposed action, due process requires notice to that party." (R. 183; see also Add. A.). 
See also Dairy Product Servs., Inc. v. City of Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, [^49, 13 P.3d 581 
(due process in the context of a municipal hearing is concerned with the opportunity of 
interested parties to express concerns to an impartial decision maker). 
As set forth above, in the instant case, the September 4, 2002, Planning 
Commission meeting was not a public hearing and therefore public comment was not 
taken by the Planning Commission. Rather, any member of the public attending the 
meeting was a mere spectator to the proceedings. Thus, Petitioners cannot show that the 
Planning Commission's decision would have been different had they been present at the 
meeting. Therefore, the failure to mail notice did not prejudice Petitioners. 
B. Petitioners have Already Presented their Views and Objections to the 
Planning Commission and the City Council and therefore have had 
their Voices Heard on this Matter. 
Second, Petitioners argue that they have a right to have their voices heard before 
the City Council. However, Petitioners are quick to forget and their brief entirely ignores 
the fact that they previously had the opportunity, on two separate occasions, to voice their 
concerns before both the Planning Commission and the City Council. 
As set forth above, Petitioners Karen Golay, Grace Blackburn, and Morgan 
Bingham presented their objections to the City Council in the January 9, 2002, public 
hearing. Representatives and residents of the Highlands Homeowners Association and 
Turtle Creek Homeowners Association also presented their objections to the City Council 
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in the January 9, 2002, public hearing, and to the Planning Commission in the November 
7, 2001, public hearing. The Turtle Creek Homeowners Association also presented a 
letter objecting to Wheeler's application. The general sentiment of these objections was 
concern with safety, traffic, noise, and fumes. 
The Planning Commission took these concerns into consideration and addressed 
the same by imposing, inter alia, on Wheeler's conditional use permit, quiet time hours, 
entrance and exit traffic prohibitions, surrounding block walls and trees, dust free 
surfacing, and landscaping. Indeed, the Planning Commission did an admirable job of 
addressing the concerns of Petitioners and other local residents in light of the fact that 
Judge Beacham had previously ruled that such concerns constituted unsubstantiated 
opinion and public clamor. (R. 270-274.). Thus, it cannot be said that Petitioners were 
denied the opportunity to participate in this process. Cf Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
17 Utah 2d 300, 303, 410 P.2d 764, 766 (1966) (holding failure of notice does not 
invalidate action where party entitled to notice participated in the hearing). 
Further, as noted above, conspicuously absent from Petitioners' brief is any 
mention of what specific conditions Petitioners would seek that are different from what 
has already been imposed. In essence, what Petitioners seek is a third and fourth bite at 
the apple without any mention of what they would seek, if anything, that is different from 
what is already in place. 
In sum, the City's failure to adhere to Section 3-6 did not prejudice Petitioners, as 
the result of such compliance would not have resulted in a different outcome. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT PETITIONERS' 
FAILURE TO APPEAL THE PLANNING COMMISSION'S DECISION TO 
THE CITY COUNCIL DEPRIVED IT OF JURISDICTION. 
The Municipal Land Use Development and Management Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 
10-9-101 to -1003 (1999 & Supp. 2002), provides that appeals from municipal planning 
commission decisions regarding conditional use permits must be heard and decided by 
the municipal body designated by the municipality's zoning ordinance. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-9-704(2). Washington City Zoning Ordinance has designated the Washington 
City Council as the legislative body to hear conditional use permit appeals from the 
Planning Commission. See Wash. City Zoning Ord. § 8-6. 
Washington City Zoning Ordinance § 8-6 provides that any person desiring to 
appeal the Planning Commission's conditional use permit decisions must file that appeal 
in writing with the City within 10 working days of the decision. See id. 
It is undisputed that Petitioners failed to appeal the Planning Commission's 
decision to approve Wheeler's application for the conditional use permit to the City 
Council as required by Section 8-6. Instead of adhering to the City's administrative 
procedure, Petitioners challenged the Planning Commission's land use decision by 
bringing the instant action directly to the district court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(1) provides: "No person may challenge in district 
court a municipality's land use decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation 
made under authority of this chapter until that person has exhausted his administrative 
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remedies." This requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial review. See 
Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7,1ffil5-l75 67 P.3d 466. 
Therefore, because Petitioners failed to adhere to the appeals procedures of 
Washington City Zoning Ordinance, they have not exhausted their administrative 
remedies as required by Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(1). Thus, the trial court correctly 
concluded it was without jurisdiction over Petitioners' action. 
The City is aware that one of Petitioners' due process challenges is that failure to 
provide notice deprived them an opportunity to appeal within the 10-day deadline 
provided by Section 8-6. However, as the trial court found, the purpose of Washington 
City Zoning Ordinance § 3-6 "is to give notice to surrounding landowners to provide 
them with an opportunity to participate in the hearing the process." (R. 182; see also Add 
A, Findings & Cones., at 6.) Conversely, Section 8-6 requires that an appeal be taken to 
the City Council within 10 working days. It contains no exceptions. Thus, Petitioners 
had no more or less protection under Section 8-6 than any other citizen desiring to appeal 
the Planning Commission's decision. 
In other words, the trial court correctly disposed of Petitioners challenge to the 
City's failure to provide notice on due process grounds as set forth above. The failure of 
notice was a challenge to the meeting itself. Here, on the issue of the timeliness of an 
appeal, the concern is the trial court's jurisdiction to review the substance of the decision 
made by the Planning Commission at the meeting. Thus, Petitioners' failure to timely 
appeal the Planning Commission's decision to the City Council, deprived the trial court 
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of jurisdiction to review the substance of the Planning Commission's decision and 
determine, for example, whether the same was supported by substantial evidence in the 
record. See, e.,g„ Ralph L. Wadsworth Constr., 2000 UT App 49 at 116 (review of 
municipal land use decision is to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the 
record to support the same). 
In sum, the trial court correctly concluded Petitioners' failure to appeal the 
Planning Commission's decision deprived it of jurisdiction over the appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ J j ^day of April 2004. 
Jeffre^ ^ Starkey 
Bryan J. Pattison 
Attorneys for Washington City 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN GOLAY; et al. 
Plaintiffs/Petitioners, 
v. 
WASHINGTON CITY 
Defendant/Respondent, 
WHEELER MACHINERY CO., 
Intervenor. 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 020501937 
Judge James L. Shumate 
For the reasons set forth in the Court's Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment, it is 
hereby ORDERED that: 
1. Defendant Washington City's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted; 
2. Intervenor Wheeler Machinery Co.'s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted; 
3. Plaintiffs/Petitioners' Motion for summary judgment is denied; and 
4. Plaintiffs/Petitioners' Complaint/Petition for Review is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice and on the merits.
 /f 
DATED THIS (,J day of ^ ^ 2 0 0 3 . 
JUDGE JAMES L. SHUMATE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the OQ day of April, 2003,1 served an unsigned copy 
of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the following by 
depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to: 
Bruce R. Baird 
BAIRD & JONES, L.C. 
201 South Main, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215 
Joseph C. Rust 
KESLER & RUST 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 7 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN GOLAY; etal, 
Plaintiffs/Petitioners, 
v. 
WASHINGTON CITY 
Defendant/Respondent, 
WHEELER MACHINERY CO., 
Intervenor. 
RULING ON MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 020501937 
Judge James L. Shumate 
This matter came before the Court pursuant to the cross-motions for summary judgment 
filed by Plaintiffs/Petitioners Karen Golay, et al., Defendant/Respondent Washington City, and 
Intervenor Wheeler Machinery Co. This is an appeal by Plaintiffs/Petitioners from the 
Washington City Planning Commission's approval of Intervenor Wheeler Machinery Co.'s 
application for a conditional use permit. 
The Court, after having reviewed the parties' memoranda and the record filed by the City, 
originally granted Washington City's Motion for Summary Judgment without a hearing. 
However, at the request of Plaintiffs, the Court agreed to hold a hearing on the matter which 
hearing was heard by this Court on April 15,2003. The Court hereby makes the following 
findings, conclusions, and rulings on said motions. 
1 
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UNDISPUTED FACTS1 
1. On November 7,2001, the Washington City Planning Commission ("Planning 
Commission") held a public hearing to consider Wheeler Machinery, Co.'s ("Wheeler") 
application to the City for a conditional use permit. Wheeler applied for the conditional use 
permit to locate a commercial business at 203 North Playa Delia Rosita in Washington City, 
Utah. 
2. The Planning Commission voted to deny Wheeler's application for the 
conditional use permit. 
3. Pursuant to Washington City Zoning Ordinance 8-6, Wheeler appealed the 
Planning Commission's decision to the Washington City Council ("City Council"). 
4. On January 9, 2002, the City Council held a public hearing to consider Wheeler's 
appeal of the Planning Commission's decision. After the hearing, in which public comment was 
taken from area residents, the City Council, by a 3-2 vote, affirmed the Planning Commission's 
denial of Wheeler's application. 
5. On January 14,2002, Wheeler appealed the City Council's decision to this Court. 
The case, In re Wheeler Machinery Co., Case No. 02050091, was assigned to the Honorable G. 
Rand Beacham. 
6. Wheeler filed a motion for summary judgment and supporting memoranda and 
the City submitted memoranda opposing Wheeler's motion. In addition to written memoranda, 
each party presented oral arguments to the court. 
The statement of facts are adapted from both the City's Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Wheeler Machinery's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, which facts were 
undisputed by the other parties hereto and therefore are deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration. 
2 
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7. On August 12, 2002, Judge Beacham rendered his decision, and in an extensive 
opinion, ruled in favor of Wheeler. 
8. In his decision, Judge Beacham found that under the applicable standard of 
review as set forth by the Utah Court of Appeals in Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction, Inc. v. 
West Jordan City, 2000 UT App 49, 999 P.2d 1240, there was not substantial evidence in the 
record to support the City Council's denial of Wheeler's conditional use permit. 
9. On September 4,2002, Wheeler's application for a conditional use permit again 
came before the Planning Commission for consideration. 
10. Public notice of the September 4,2002, Planning Commission meeting was 
provided by the City as follows: (a) a true and correct copy of the meeting agenda was posted in 
a conspicuous place in the Washington City Offices located at 111 North 100 East, Washington, 
Utah, at least 24 hours prior to the meeting; (b) a true and correct copy of the meeting agenda 
was posted on the City's website located at www.washington-ut.net at least 24 hours prior to the 
meeting; and (c) a true and correct copy of the meeting agenda was provided to the Spectrum, & 
newspaper of general circulation in Southern Utah, at least 24 hours prior to the meeting. 
11. The public notice of the meeting agenda clearly showed, at item no. 10, that 
Wheeler's application for a conditional use permit would be considered at the meeting by the 
Planning Commission. 
12. Notice of the September 4,2002, Planning Commission meeting was not mailed 
to residents living within a 300-foot radius of Wheeler's property. 
13. Item 10 of the September 4,2002, Planning Commission meeting was not a 
public hearing and therefore no public comment or input was heard. Rather, the Planning 
Commission staff advised the Planning Commission that all items of concern had been addressed 
3 
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at the previous two public hearings on the matter (November 7, 2001, before the Planning 
Commission, and January 9, 2002, before the City Council) and recommended that the Planning 
Commission approve Wheeler's application for the conditional use permit with certain 
conditions. 
14. The Planning Commission voted to approve Wheeler's application for the 
conditional use permit, subject to Wheeler's ability to meet certain conditions recommended by 
the staff: 
15. Pursuant to Washington City Zoning Ordinance 8-6, any person could appeal the 
Planning Commission's decision to approve Wheeler's conditional use permit application to the 
City Council by filing an appeal with the City Council within 10 working days following the date 
of the decision. 
16. None of the Plaintiffs/Petitioners ("Plaintiffs") filed an appeal of the decision with 
the City. In fact, no appeals challenging the Planning Commission's decision were filed with 
City. 
17. On or about September 20, 2002, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to 
intervene in and motion for reconsideration of Judge Beacham's summary judgment ruling in In 
re Wheeler Machinery Co. arguing, inter alia, that the City was not adequately represented by 
counsel. 
18. On November 5,2002, Judge Beacham denied Plaintiffs' motion to intervene on 
the grounds that final judgment had been entered in In re Wheeler Machinery, that the motion to 
intervene was not timely, and that the City was adequately represented by counsel. 
19. On or about October 4, 2002, Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit/petition for 
review. 
4 
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ANALYSIS 
A. 
The Court concludes (as stipulated by all parties) that, under the doctrine of law of the 
case, it is bound to follow Judge Beacham's Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment as 
reflected in In re Wheeler Machinery Co., Case No. 02050091. Therefore, in light of Judge 
Beacham's mandate that the City grant Wheeler Machinery's application for a conditional use 
permit, the administrative record for the taking of public comment was closed with regard to 
hearing additional evidence of the viability of Wheeler's application. 
B. 
The Municipal Land Use Development and Management Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9-
101 to -1003 (1999 & Supp. 2002), provides that appeals from municipal planning commission 
decisions regarding conditional use permits must be heard and decided by the municipal body 
designated by the municipality's zoning ordinance. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-704(2). 
Washington City Zoning Ordinance has designated the Washington City Council as the 
legislative body to hear conditional use permit appeals from the Planning Commission. See 
Washington City Zoning Ordinance § 8-6 (attached as Exhibit B). 
Washington City Zoning Ordinance § 8-6 provides that any person desiring to appeal the 
Planning Commission's conditional use permit decisions must file that appeal in writing with the 
City within 10 working days of the decision. See id. 
It is undisputed that Plaintiffs failed to appeal the Planning Commission's decision to 
approve Wheeler's application for the conditional use permit to the City Council as required by 
Section 8-6. 
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Therefore, because Plaintiffs failed to adhere to the appeals procedures of Washington 
City Zoning Ordinance, they have not exhausted their administrative remedies as required by 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(1). As a result, this Court is without jurisdiction to consider 
Plaintiffs'Complaint/Petition. 
c . v"r:"' 
The intent of Section 3-6 of the Washington City Ordinances is to give notice to 
surrounding landowners to provide them with an opportunity to participate in the hearing 
process. Once a public hearing has been closed, no further public comment is allowed. This is 
true whether the ultimate decision approving or denying a request for a conditional use permit is 
made at the same meeting as the public hearing or continued until a later date. 
When the denial of Wheeler's application for a conditional use permit was reversed by 
Judge Beacham, the matter was sent back down to the Planning Commission for consideration in 
light of Judge Beacham's ruling. The matter was not remanded to the Planning Commission 
with an instruction that the Planning Commission begin the entire process over. Rather, the 
administrative record on the matter was closed, and the Planning Commission thus considered 
Wheeler's application in light of the record and Judge Beacham's ruling, which ruling was based 
on that same record. 
Thus, with no public hearing taking place, Section 3-6 did not require mailed notice to 
surrounding landowners. Indeed, pursuant to Utah law, the appropriate notice was provided to 
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the public by posting as set forth in paragraph 10, above. No other notice under Utah statute was 
required. 
Even if Section 3-6 required mailed notice of the September 4, 2002, meeting, the City's 
failure to do so did not violate Plaintiffs' right to due process or invalidate the action taken by the 
Planning Commission because such notice would not have resulted in a different outcome. See 
Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, pO, 979 P.2d 
332. 
While the Utah Supreme Court in Springville Citizens did not specifically refer to the 
right of due process, it has previously explained the reason for the requirement of notice as 
necessary to protect the right to due process. The notice requirement, according to the supreme 
court, is "to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present their objections " Tolman v. Salt Lake County, 20 Utah 2d 310, 318, 
437 P.2d 442,448 (1968) (citation and quotation omitted). In other words, where an interested 
party might have an opportunity to be heard and present his or her objections to a proposed 
action, due process requires notice to that party. 
The September 4,2002, Planning Commission meeting was not a public hearing and 
therefore public comment was not taken by the Planning Commission. Rather, any member of 
the public attending the meeting was a mere spectator to the proceedings. 
Thus, even if Plaintiffs were entitled to mailed notice from the Planning Commission 
because they lived within a 300 feet of the subject property and failed to attend or otherwise did 
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not know about the meeting because they were not mailed notice, they cannot show that the 
Planning Commission's decision would have been different had they been present at the meeting. 
Therefore, the failure to mail notice did not prejudice Plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
There are no genuine issues of material fact before this Court, and Defendant Washington 
City and Intervenor 'Wheeler Machinery are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, 
Defendant Washington City's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, Intervenor 
Wheeler Machinery's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and Plaintiffs/Petitioner's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
DATED THIS / J> day of AfisJ, 2003. 
JUJ5GE JAMES L. SHUMATE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
2& I hereby certify that on the QJ day of April, 2003,1 served an unsigned copy 
of the foregoing RULING ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the following 
by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to: 
Bruce R. Baird 
BAIRD & JONES, L.C. 
201 South Main, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215 
Joseph C. Rust 
KESLER & RUST 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
F:\SGDOCS\JSTAJUCEYWASHINGTON CITY FOLDERSNGolay 3042701\SUMMARY JUDGMENT 042203.doc 
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Washington City, Utah 
Zoning Ordinance 
Effective March 1996 
CHAPTER 3. PLANNING COMMISSION 
3-1 Planning Commission, Number of Members, Appointment. 
The Washington City Planning Commission is hereby established for 
the purpose of developing plans for the physical development of 
the City, making reports and recommendations relating to the 
development of the City, administering the applicable provisions 
of this Ordinance, and to carry out any other activities 
authorized by the City Council to enable the Planning Commission 
to perform its functions and to promote municipal planning. 
The Planning Commission shall consist of five (5) members and one 
(1) alternate, appointed by the City Council. All persons 
appointed to the Planning Commission shall be residents of 
Washington City and owners of real property therein. At least 
three (3) of the members shall hold no other public office or 
position. The City Council shall appoint a representative from 
among its members to act as a liaison between the City Council 
and Planning Commission. One (1) member of the Planning 
Commission shall be a member of the Board of Adjustment. The 
alternate.member of the Planning Commission shall attend all 
meetings of the Planning Commission and may participate in all 
discussions and proceedings; however, he or she may vote only in 
the case where another Planning Commissioner is absent. 
3-2 Terms of Office. 
The terms of office of the appointed members of the Planning 
Commission shall be three (3) years and until their respective 
successors have been appointed. The member terms shall be filled 
so as to bring about staggered terms so that the terms of two (2) 
members expire each year. The City Council may reappoint any 
Planning Commissioner to any number of subsequent terms. 
3-3 Vacancies and Removal for Cause. 
Vacancies of appointed members occurring other than through the 
expiration of terms shall be filled for the remainder of the 
unexpired term by the City Council. The City Council shall have 
the right to remove any member of the Planning Commission for 
misconduct or non-performance of duty. Non-performance of duty 
shall include a repeated failure to attend Planning Commission 
meetings. 
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Washington City, Utah 
Zoning Ordinance 
Effective Marcn 1996 
3-4 Compensation. 
The Planning Commission shall serve without compensation, except 
that the City Council shall provide for the-reimbursement of the 
Planning Commission for actual expenses incurred, upon 
presentation of proper receipts and vouchers. 
3-5 Officers. 
The Planning Commission shall elect from its members a Chairman, 
whose term shall be one (1) year. The Planning Commission may 
create and fill other offices as it may deem necessary. 
3-6 Meetings. 
The Planning Commission shall conduct regularly scheduled 
meetings which shall be properly advertised and open to the 
public. Notice of Planning Commission meetings shall be mailed 
to all property owners appearing on the latest ownership plat in 
the Washington County Recorders Office within a three hundred 
(300) foot radius of any property for which an action of the 
Planning Commission is being requested. It shall be the 
responsibility of the applicant for such action to provide the 
stamped, addressed envelopes necessary to provide such notice. 
All other costs involved with processing Planning Commission 
applications shall be the responsibility of the party or parties 
making such application. 
3-7 Rules and Procedures. 
The Planning Commission may adopt such rules and procedures as it 
may deem necessary for the proper conduct of its business. The 
Planning Commission shall keep a record of its proceedings, which 
shall be open to inspection by the public at all reasonable 
times. 
3-8 Quorum and Vote. 
A quorum shall consist of three (3) members. Evidence shall not 
be presented unless a quorum is present. A majority vote of the 
members present shall be required in order to carry any motion. 
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Washington City, Utah 
Zoning Ordinance 
Effective March 1996 
3-9 Employees and Expenditures. 
The Planning Commission may, upon approval of the City Council, 
employ such staff as it may deem necessary'for its work, and may 
contract: with city planners or other consultants for such 
services as it requires, provided that the expenditures of the 
Planning Commission shall not be in excess of such sums as may be 
appropriated by the City Council. 
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Washington City, Utah 
Zoning Ordinance 
Effective March 1996 
CHAPTER 8. CONDITIONAL USES 
8-1 Purpose of Conditional Use Provisions. 
Certain uses which may be harmonious under special conditions and 
in specific locations within a district may be improper under 
general conditions and in other locations. A Conditional Use 
Permit is intended to allow the proper integration of such uses 
into Washington City only if such uses are designed and laid out 
in a manner approved by the Planning Commission. This Chapter 
describes the process required to obtain a Conditional Use 
Permit. 
8-2 Permit Required. 
A Conditional Use Permit shall be required for all uses listed as 
conditional uses in the district regulations or elsewhere in this 
Ordinance. A Conditional Use Permit may be revoked by the 
Planning Commission upon failure to comply with conditions 
precedent to the original approval of the Permit. 
8-3 Application. 
Application for a Conditional Use Permit shall be made by the 
property owner of certified agent thereof at the Washington City 
Office on forms provided for that purpose twenty (20) working 
days prior to the regularly scheduled meeting of the Planning 
Commission at which the application is to be considered. Notice 
of Planning Commission meetings shall be mailed to all property 
owners appearing on the latest ownership plat in the Washington 
County Recorders Office within a 300 foot radius of any property 
for which an action of the Planning Commission is being 
requested. It shall be the responsibility of the applicant for 
such action to provide the stamped, addressed envelopes necessary 
to provide such notice. 
8-4 Fee. 
The application for any Conditional Use Permit shall be 
accompanied by the appropriate fee as determined by the City 
Council. 
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Washington City, Utah 
Zoning Ordinance 
Effective March 1996 
8-5 Site Development Plan Approval. 
1) The applicant for a Conditional Use Permit shall 
prepare a Site Development Plan which *meets the following 
criteria: 
a) Name and address of applicant; 
b) The location and dimensions of all existing and 
proposed buildings, fences, and other structures 
located on the proposed site; 
c) Proposed landscaping plan; 
d) The location and dimensions of existing and 
proposed roads, automobile parking and loading areas, 
and traffic circulation patterns; 
e) The location and dimensions of existing and 
proposed drainage facilities; 
f) The lot dimensions and a north arrow; 
g) Necessary explanatory notes; and 
h) Other materials necessary to assist the Planning 
Commission in arriving at an appropriate decision. 
The Site Development Plan shall be submitted with the 
application for a Conditional Use Permit at least twenty 
(20) working days before the regularly scheduled Planning 
Commission meeting at which the application is to be 
considered. 
2) The planning staff shall contact interested department 
personnel of the City and other public agencies for review 
purposes. The planning staff shall furnish to the applicant 
any comments regarding the Site Development Plan which may 
assist the applicant in preparing the request for 
presentation to the Planning Commission. If any such 
department or agency requests additional time for review of 
the Site Development Plan, the planning staff may recommend 
to the Planning Commission that deliberation of the 
application be postponed until the next regularly scheduled 
meeting of the Planning Commission. The application cannot 
be postponed for more than two (2) Planning Commission 
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Washington City, Utah 
Zoning Ordinance 
Effective March 1996 
meetings after the submittal of the application. 
3) The Planning Commission may approve, modify and 
approve, or deny any application for a.Conditional Use 
Permit to be located within any district in which the 
particular conditional use is permitted by the use 
regulations of this Ordinance. In authorizing any 
Conditional Use Permit, the Planning Commission shall impose 
such requirements and conditions as required by law and any 
additional conditions as may be necessary for the protection 
of adjacent properties and the public welfare. 
Such conditions of approval may include, but shall not be 
limited to specifications concerning: structures; land-
scaping; density; ingress-egress; fencing; parking; or 
lighting. Height, density and size requirements for 
structures in each zone are maximum and may be reduced or 
modified as conditions to the approval of any Conditional 
Use application. 
The Planning Commission shall not authorize a Conditional 
Use Permit unless evidence is presented showing: 
a) The proposed use, at the particular location, is 
necessary or desirable to provide a service or facility 
which will contribute to the general well-being of the 
neighborhood and community; and 
b) That such use will not, under the circumstances of 
the particular case, be detrimental to the health, 
safety or general welfare of persons residing or 
working in the vicinity, or injurious to property or 
improvements in the vicinity; and 
c) That the proposed use will comply with the 
regulations and conditions specified in this Ordinance 
for such use; and 
d) That the proposed use will conform to the intent of 
the Washington City Master Plan. 
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Washington City, Utah 
Zcninq Crainance 
Effective .March 1996 
8-6 Appeal of Decision.11 
Any person shall have the right to appeal to the Washington City 
Cguncil any decision rendered by the Planning Commission in 
relation to Conditional Use Permit decisions. Appeals to the 
City Council are made by filing/ in writing/ the reasons for the 
appeals to the City Council<^ithin ten (10) working daysv 
following the date upon which the decision is made by tHe 
Planning Commission. After receiving said appeal, the City 
Council may reaffirm the Planning Commission decision or set a 
date for a public hearing. 
1) The City Council shall notify the Planning Commission of the 
date of said hearing at least seven (7) days preceding the 
date set for such hearing so that the Planning Commission 
may prepare to record for said hearing. 
2) The City Council after proper review of the decision of the 
Commission and application of the standards listed in 
Section 8-5 above, may affirm, reverse, alter or remand any 
action taken by the Planning Commission. 
8-7 Expansion of a Conditional Use. 
No structure or use allowed by the issuance of a Conditional Use 
Permit may be expanded without the approval of the Planning 
Commission. The applicant for such expansion shall follow the 
same application procedures as are listed above. 
8-8 Inspection.12 
Following the issuance of a Conditional Use Permit by the 
Planning Commission, the official charged with the enforcement of 
this Ordinance shall review and approve an application for a 
building permit pursuant to Section 2-2 of this Ordinance and 
shall ensure that the development is undertaken and completed in 
compliance with all conditions and permits pertaining to said 
development. 
11
 This section was amended on May 5, 1989 by Ordinance No. 
89-11 and was subsequently amended on December 9, 1992 by 
Ordinance No. 92-37 
*
 12
 This section was amended on February 28, 199 6 by 
Ordinance No. 9 6-07 
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Washington City, Utah 
2cring Ordinance 
Effective March 1996 
No Certificate of Occupancy or Business Licence shall be issued 
by any city employee for any use authorized by conditional use 
approval, nor shall any structure be occupied until the official 
charged with the enforcement of this ordinance certifies that all 
conditions of the permit have been completed, or that the 
applicant has filed a performance bond with the city which 
guarantees the completion of all required conditions, and that 
the applicant has complied with all conditions placed upon the 
permit at the time of approval of the conditional use permit, 
8-9 Time Limit. 
All Conditional- Use Permits shall expire within a maximum period 
of one (1) year of issuance, unless there shall have been 
substantial performance toward the completion of the conditions 
set forth in the permit. The Planning Commission may grant a 
maximum extension of six (6) months under exceptional 
circumstances. In the event that a Conditional Use Permit is 
granted on a. temporary basis, the Planning Commission may issue a 
permit for six (6) months, with one (1) maximum extension of six 
(6) months. A Conditional Use Permit shall be non-transferable. 
8-10 Revocation. 
A Conditional Use Permit may be revoked by the Planning 
Commission after a hearing is held where the Planning Commission 
determines that the applicant has failed to comply with the 
conditions imposed with the original permit. The permit may be 
reinstated upon the determination of the Planning Commission that 
the cause for revocation has been corrected and that the 
applicant has submitted evidence indicating that the Site 
Development Plan approved by the Planning Commission will be 
completed in a time frame accepted and approved by the Planning 
Commission. 
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Washington City 
Planning Commission Meeting 
Staff Review 
Hearing Date: September 4, 2002 
Requested Action: Request to locate Wheeler Machinery 
Application Number: C-2001-59 
Applicant: Steve Wells / Wheeler Machinery 
Location: 203 N. Playa Delia Rosita 
Current Zoning: Commercial - 3 
Reviewed by: Danice Bulloch 
This request it to approve the Conditional Use Permit C-2001-59, to locate Wheeler Machinery 
at 205 N. Playa Delia Rosita. The site plan before the Planning Commission is the same as was 
originally submitted on September 11,2001. Mr. Wells has met with staff to review the 
submitted site plan. Staff feels that all of the items of concern have been addressed from the 
September 11,2001 and November 7,2001 meetings. Staff recommends approval of this use 
with the following conditions and recommendations: 
1. The elevation of this property drops approx. 28-feet from the rear to Buena Vista Blvd. 
The area along the east side adjacent to Buena Vista Blvd. will be raised 7-foot to 8-foot 
andfmaintaiifas landscape area. The area in the rear will have a drop of 7-foot to 8-
foot. This drbp in elevation will maintain a 3:1 slope to be covered by landscape rock. ' 
This will need to be shown on the landscaping plan. 
2. At the north end of the lot, along the top of the slope, a 4-foot to 6-foot block wall with 
trees will be installed. 
(Trees will be installed to help filter out the sound and breakup the visibility of the use 
and fence adjacent to the residential area. This needs to be shown on the site plan and b^L 
included in the landscaping plan.) 
3. The hours of the office are to be from 7:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.. 
4. Quite time will be from 10:00 P.M. to 7:00 A.M.. 
5. . The building is to be constructed with tilt up concrete walls. ^^ 
(The elevation show^he building is to be constructed of metal. This is not the case* the 
building will be concrete but will have the same appearance as shown on the Elevation 
Plan.) 
6. The sign for this use will be of a monument or pole type. 
(The exact location of the sign has not been determined at this time but will be located 
along the Buena Vista Boulevard. Should the sign be a pole type sign the applicant stated 
that the pole would have a shroud that would cover the pole base.) 
7. The entrance on the west side of this project is to be an exit only. 
*D«~A 1 000079 
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(The entrance has been designed such that if a driver with a 55-foot truck and trailer 
missed the turn onto Playa Delia Rosita, then the vehicle will still be able to enter the site 
without driving through the adjacent residential area.) 
The main entrance is to be on the east sid&off of Playa Delia Rosita. 
(After reviewing with the Public Works Director, staff and Mr. Wells, it has been 
determined that the main entrance should be from Playa Delia Rosita. With the entrance 
on the eastside and exit on the westside this would allow larger trucks with trailers to 
make left turns into this area. This will eliminate vehicles from driving over and 
destroying the curbs. This direction will also keep these large trucks with trailers from 
making wide turns into on coming traffic when entering the property.) 
The surfacing of the drive area from the entrance to the exit is to be a hard surface. This 
is to be reviewed in one year to see if this gravel or road base material is being carried out 
onto the public streets. 
(Again after reviewing with the Public Works Director, staff and Mr. Wells, it has been 
determined that the gravel surface would be preferred. There is an apron of asphalt on the 
east entrance of approx. 40-foot. The entrance on the west has an asphalt apron of 
approx. 100-feet. This should keep all gravel off of the streets. Staff is requesting that 
this be reviewed again^h one year only ifz. problem exis® t 
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Washington Ciry 
Planning Commission 
Stpambtr 4,2002 
Mr, Snow said he has reviewed it and thinks it a good idea to send this on to City Council-
Chairman Simmons asked how much water is available in Washington City and how much more 
building can be done before the City runs out of water? 
Mr. Zabriskie said that Chairman Simmons question is a critical one and is addressed in the 
request.. 
Chairman Simmons called for amotion. 
Commissioner Van Der Heyden moved to forward this proposal to City Council with Planning 
Commission's recommendation for approval Commissioner Wiley 2** The motion carried. 
9. Amend Zoning Ordinance Chapter 10-A Design Standards for Single Dwellings outside a 
Mobile Home Zone; Applicant - Washington City* 
Crefg Maynes reviewed, 
***SEE ATTACHED*** 
Mr, Maynes explained that condition number 6 sets a roof pitch requirement and that Number 9 is 
important in that it addresses the mmtmimi width He pointed out that Number 11 specifies the lot 
size and size of the home on the lot 
Commissioner Latschkowski asked if the City currently has an ordinance of this type? 
Mr. Maynes said no, 
Mr. Snow stated he has some concern about the minimum size requirement and added he would 
like to review it a little more. 
Chairman Simmons called for a motion 
Commissioner Latschkowski moved to recommend that City Council approve amending Zoning 
Ordinance Chapter 10-A and instruct the City Attorney to review and possibly revise this 
amendment before sending it on to City Council. Comxomiowr Van Der Heyden Td. The 
motion carried. 
u y C-2001-59 Approval of site plan for Wheeler Machinery located at 203 N. Playa Delia 
•Kosita} Applicant - Steve Wells/Wheeler Machinery, 
Mr, Snow wanted to explain to Planning Commission for the benefit of the public present so they 
11 . 
oooQS: Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Washington City 
Planning Commisaioa 
Sepwmbtr4,2002 
might be aware of what is going on. The public hearing for this has been closed and would suggest 
that it not be reopened for discussion by the public, 
Danlce Bulloch reviewed. 
This request it to approve the Conditional Use Permit C-2001-59, to locate Wheeler Machinery at 
205 N. Playa Delia Rosita, The site plan before the Planning Commission is the same as was 
originally submitted on September 11,2001. Mr. Wells has met with staff to review the submitted 
site plan* Staff feels that all of the items of concern have been addressed from the September 11, 
2001 and November 7,2001 meetings. Staff recommends approval of this use with the following 
conditions and recommendations: 
1. The elevation of this property drops approx. 28-feet from the rear to Buena Vista Blvd. 
The area along the east side adjacent to Buena Vista Blvd will be raised 7-foot to 8-foot 
and be maintained as landscape area. The area in the rear will have a drop of 7-foot to 
8-foot This drop in elevation will maintain a 3:1 slope to be covered by landscape rock. 
This will need to be shown on tiie landscaping plan, 
2. At the north end of the lot, along the top of the slope, a 4-foot to 6-foot block wall with 
trees will be installed. 
(Trees will be installed to help filter out the sound and breajcup the visibility of the use and 
fence adjacent to the residential area. This item needs to be shown on the site plan and 
. included in the landscaping plan.) 
3. The hours of the office are to be from 7:00 A-M. to 5:00 P.M.. 
4. Quite time will be from 10:00 P.M. to 7:00 AM*. 
5. The building is to be constmeted with tilt up concrete walls. 
(The elevation shows the building is to be constructed of metal. This is not the case. The 
building will be concrete but will have the same appearance as shown on the Elevation 
Plan.) 
6. The sign for this use will be of a monument or pole type, 
(The exact location of the sign has not been determined at this time but will be located 
along the Bucna Vista Boulevard. Should the sign be a pole type sign the applicant stated 
that the pole would have a shroud that would cover the pole base.) 
7. ' The approach on the west side of this project is to be an exit only. 
(The entrance has been designed such that if a driver with a 55-foot truck and trailer 
missed the turn onto Playa Delia Rosita, then the vehicle will still be able to enter the site 
without driving through die adjacent residents 
8. The main entrance is to be on the east side off of Playa Delia Rosita. 
(After reviewing with the Public Works Director, staff and Mr. Wells, it has been 
determined that the main entrance should be from Playa Delia Rosita. With the entrance on 
the eastside and exit on the westside this would allow larger trucks with trailers to make 
left rums into this area. This will eliminate vehicles from driving over and destroying the 
curbs. This direction will also keep these large trucks witibi trailers from making wide 
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Washrnpon City 
Planning Carnmlsiion 
September^ 2002 
turns into on coming traffic when altering the property.) 
9. The surfacing of the drive area from the entrance to the exit is to be a dust free surface. 
This is to be reviewed in one year to see if this gravel or road base material is being 
carried out onto the public streets. 
(Again after reviewing with the Public Works Director, staff and Mr. Wells, it has been 
determined that the gravel surface would be preferred There is an apron of asphalt on the 
east entrance of approx. 40-foot The entrance on the west has an asphalt apron of approx. 
100-feet This should keep all gravel off of the streets. Staff is requesting that this be 
reviewed again in one year only if* problem exists.) 
Ms. Bulloch explained that staff has found Mr. Wells to be very cooperative. She explained the 
landscaping and pointed out areas of interest and special buffering using trees and block walls. 
Mr S now asked what 'quiet time' means. 
Ms. Bulloch said 'quiet time' is when work will be done indoors or not at alL 
Steve Wells representing Wheeler Machinery addressed the Commission and offered to clarify 
any issues they may have. He addressed the landscaping issue on the north property line and 
pointed out that the 3 to 1 slope is too steep for trees but they could do one of two things, a straight 
retaining wall or leave a slope with gravel and some plants. He explained that a retaining wall 
could present a danger if someone was to fall off the top it would be a 15 foot drop. There is a 
drainage problem at the top so the chain link fence may have to go. Concerning the entrance being 
on Playa Delia Rosita and the exit on Cactus Lane he explained this will not be exclusive. There 
may be times when a truck makes the wrong turn and rather th** having them go around the north 
through the neighborhood it would be better to just have them enter off of Cactus Lane. He added 
that the entrance and exit had been widened. 
Mr. Snow stated the previous traffic study showed the turn on Cactus Lane would cause a 55 foot 
truck to go into the oncoming traffic lane. He asked Mr. Wells if Wheeler Machinery had widened 
Cactus Lane enough so that a 55 foot truck would NOT go into the other lane? 
Mr, Wells said a truck will not run into the other lane when coming out onto cactus lane. A truck 
WILL run into the other lane when entering from Cactus Lane. 
Commissioner 5vans said this should be unacceptable. 
Commissioner Latschkowski said the Commission's preference is if Cactus Lane can be used 
mainly as an exit He asked if there is a sidewalk along Cactus Lane? 
Mr. Wells replied there is not a sidewalk along Cactus Lane. 
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Commissioner Latsehkowski said he thought a sidewalk is required, 
Ms. Bulloch explained the sidewalk will be required. 
Mr, Wells said this is the first time sidewalk has been mentioned. 
Ms. Bulloch led Mr. Wells and Mr. Snow to the plat to get a better look. Mr. Snow confirmed that 
a sidewalk is showti. on the plat 
Mr. Snow asked if there will be signage that shows Cactus Lane as an entrance or rental drop off? 
Mr. Wells said they could have signage that shows all traffic coming in on Playa Delia Rosita. 
Doug Jackson also with Wheeler's Machinery said it is better for traffic flow to have everyone 
coming in and going out of the same areas. 
Chairman Simmons asked Mr. Wells if anyone will be able to start their engines during quiet 
time. 
Mr. Wells replied that no one will be working during quiet time. 
Mr, Snow wanted to clarify if Mr. Wells meant no one will be working outside during quiet time 
or no one will be working at all during quiet time. 
Mr. Wells said no one will be working at all during quiet time. He added that Wheeler's 
Machinery does not have a night shift. 
Commissioner Evans pointed out that it would be a mistake to put a sign on Cactus Lane saying it 
is an exit only because trucks may go around the neighborhood rather than going in. 
Ms. Bulloch suggested that Public Works may want to check the signage before installing. 
Commissioner Wiley moved to approve C-2001-59 with the recommendations of staff and the 
revision of a.) In item number 2 the block wall will be six feet and the landscaping plan will 
be approved by staffpriorto installation. 
bj The exit only signage recommended in item number 7 will be approved by staff 
prior to installation. 
cj A renew of compliance will be held in six months rather than a year as 
mentioned in item number P. 
Commissioner Van DerHeyden 2nd. The motion carried 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
JAN 2 ? 2004 
Paulette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
Karen Golay; Grace Blackburn; 
Eileen Blake; Brian 
Christiansen; Morgan Bingham; 
Dave Stark; ETC/TB Daycare, 
Inc.; Gary Westfall; David 
Beagley; Washington-Ridgeview 
Associates; Terry Campbell; 
The Highlands Homeowners 
Association; and Turtle Creek 
Homeowners Association, 
Petitioners and Appellants, 
Washington City, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
Wheeler Machinery Co., 
Intervenor and Appellee. 
ORDER 
Case No. 20030528-CA 
This case is before the court on Appellee Wheeler Machinery 
Co.!s Suggestion of Mootness. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appelleefs request that this court 
dismiss the appeal is denied, and a ruling on the issues raised 
in Appellee's Suggestion of Mootness is deferred pending plenary 
presentation and consideration of the appeal. See Utah R. App. 
P. 10(f). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in addition to briefing the 
merits, the parties shall brief the issue of whether the appeal 
is moot. The parties will be notified when a briefing schedule 
has been established. 
DATED this ^ ?7 day of January, 2004. 
FOR THE COURT 
iddTth M. B i l l ings , " \y Juc 
P r e s i d i n g Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on January 29, 2004, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail to the parties listed below: 
JOSEPH C. RUST 
KESLER & RUST 
2000 BENEFICIAL LIFE TOWER 
36 S STATE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
BRUCE R. BAIRD 
BAIRD & JONES 
299 S MAIN ST STE 1300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111-2215 
JEFFREY N. STARKEY 
BRYAN J. PATTISON 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
192 E 200 N 3RD FLR 
ST GEORGE UT 84770 
Dated this January 29, 2004. 
Deputy Clerk ~/ 
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